Abstract -This paper presents a detailed assessment of terahertz-frequency spectroscopy as a technique for the remote detection of biological warfare agents. Design studies are presented for a differential-absorption-radar (DAR) approach that utilizes the spectral signatures of Barillus (E) subtillus spores within the teraherb (THz) regime as the detection mechanism. The signature data used in these studies is taken from laboratory measurements performed on uniform thin f i s of B. Subtiflu spores and the system performance is assessed for both incoherent and coherent detector modalities. These studies consider DAR remote sensing of biological (bin) clouds at significant ranges (i.e., 1 km) and include the effects of realistic atmospheric conditions. A high-level remote-sensor design is used to estimate the probabilities of detection (pd) and false-alarm @3 associated with this general technique. These studies suggest useful remote-detection performance can he achieved (i.e., p d > 0.9 & pr= << lC' for bio-cloud densities < lo' cm-3 at 1 krn ranges if the THz signature information remains predictably stable under varying atmospheric conditions (e.g., changes in humidity, spare activity state, etc). Furthermore, a realistic bio-agent airframe attack scenario is utilized to demonstrate standoff detection of bioclouds with -100% confidence while outside the threat-level concentrations. AU together, these results demonstrate that standoff detection of bio-agents is feasible far threat-level concentrations in practical battlefield environments at sufficient ranges to provide for early warning,
I. INTRODUCTION
The past and ongoing proliferation' of chemical and biological (CB) agents as instruments of warfare and terrorism bas elevated the task of developing an adequate civilian and military defense to CB threats to a vely high priority. The particular seriousness of this type of threat was emphatically underscored when the leaders of ow nation (i.e., both the President and Congress) just recently endorsed a military intervention into Iraq to, if necessary, forcibly neutralize all nuclear and CB warfare capabilities. In the cvent that our military forces or civilian population faced such threats in the fnture, an adequate defense would necessitate the ability to rapidly detect and identify both known and unknown threatagents. Clearly, the most serious threat of CB agents is the potential harm they present to the short and long-term health of the victim($. However, the actual or perceived threat of CB warfare agents can impact the operational Capability of a militaly force in the field and the productivity of the private sector even when conventional counter-measures (i.e., protective equipment and clothing) are successfully employed. This is true because protective equipment can interfere with vision, speech intelligibility, personal recognition and dexterity For these reasons, the development of reliable approaches for the detection and identification of CB agents in the field of operation, and within our homeland, is imperative.
While much work remains to improve overall sensing capabilities for both chemical and biological agents (Woolard et al., ZOOO) , the present standoff detection (and therefore also identification) techniques for biological @io) warfare agents are very limited. In fact, the development of a bio early-warning capability is of the highest prior@ to the Joint Future Operation Capability, as well as to the Joint Service Leader for Contamination Avoidance and most impomfly to the Department of Defense. Fortunately, recent scientific work in biological spectroscopy at very high frequencies bas suggested a novel avenue for a terahertz (THz) electronic approach to bio-warfare agent detection and identification (Woolard et al., 2001 ) and the extension of this work to practical sensing methodologies is the subject of this paper. (Globus, Bykhovskaia et al., 2002 , Globus, Woolard, et al., 2002 . These investigations were subsequently extended to other relevant materials (e.g., RNA) and to hio-agents (e.g., bio-spores). Measurements demonstrated that spore materials (i.e., Bacillus (B.) subtillus) also contained similar spectral signature, which are most probably attributable to the protein molecules that make up most of the spore's protective shell. While the spectral resonance characteristics are quite weak (i.e., 5-15 % variations between local minimum and maximum), these results motivated a system design study to determine the sensitivity limits of various sensor architectures that utilized a differential-absorption-radar (DAR) remotedetection approach. This paper presents system performance estimates of incoherent (i.e., direct detectiau) and coherent DAR sensars applied towards the detection of aerosol hio-clouds. As these performance estimates utilize spectral signature data obtained from laboratory measurements on thin spore films, the issue of signature stability is also addressed. Finally, a realistic air-frame release scenario is used demonstrate the high levels of detection confidence (-100%) that can be achieved by monitoring a very small field-of-view (-0.5 degrees). These results demonstrate that standoff detection of bio-agents is extremely feasible for threatlevel concentrations in practical battlefield environments at suf€icienl ranges l o pruvide for early warning.
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11. DAR SYSTEM STUDY Design studies .were performed on differentialabsorption radar P A R ) architectures that utilize active detection for sensing B. subrillus spore clouds. While passive scheme; were consider in earlier studies (Brown et al., 2002) , they were found to he too insensitive at the ranges (i.e., up to 1 km) and hioparticle concentrations (-IO' cm-') due to the small absorption cross section of the typical spectral signature and the strong absorption by water vapor in the THz region. Alternatively, active sensors are potentially more sensitive than passive ones since they provide their own source of coherent radiation at a spectral density far above the background levels. The active DAR sensor considered here consists of a coherent transmitter operating minimally at two frequencies ~ one at the center of the absorption signature and one at the edge. By subtracting the received power altemately at the two frequencies, the absorption signature can be detected even in the presence of fluctuations in the atmosphere caused by wind and variable humidity. The technique is similar in principle to differential absorption lidar (DIAL) commonly used at IR wavelengths. An illustration of the type of absorption signature obtained from the DAR system is given in Fig. 1 . Here, the system is measuring the power transmitted through a cloud of hioparticles at two hopping frequencies. For the signature of Fig. 1 and assuming that the background transmission at each v is constant one obtains
940
where Table I lists the values of v, , , ao(v,j,), and AV derived from laboratory transmission measurements through dry films of B. subtillus containing po i~ IxlO'' cm" -a density that is necessaty to get an accurate measure of A a , hut is much larger than expected in airbome bio-warfare agents. The results listed in Table I describe five different absorption features having center frequedcies behveen 327 and 1075 GHz. In the THz region, the remote detection of these signatures depends critically on the atmospheric transmission T(v~&. Because of the high relative transmission (7 = 0.25), the signature centered at 421 GHz has the hest chance of being detected by an active remote sensor having practical levels of transmit power and is the centerfrequency considered in this study. This analysis adopted the sensor-target scenario shown in Fig. 2 consisting of a ground-or air-based active sensor looking into the sky at a target consisting of a cloud of dry bioparticles at temperature TH and pressure P. Note here mu- Fig. 2 . Block diagram of sensor (coherent) and target scenario that the block diagram depicts an coherent detection system. The cloud is assumed to have physical thickness L and to be located at a range R from the sensor. Behind the cloud is a retrodirective mirror that allows the transmitter and receiver to be co-located. The mirror is oriented relative to the sensor along a line-of-sight that cuts through a trajectory of length L through the cloud. The transmitter is assumed to radiate a constant power sequentially at the two frequencies v, .
or vback. This particular system conceptualization is amenable to either a perimeter-defense type system (Le., with a stationary mirror) or a remote detection scheme where a small mirror could be mounted onto 'an unmanned airborne vehicle. Studies performed considered both incoherent and coherent DAR sensing systems and the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) performance and relative probabilities of detection and false alarm were assessed for each. Of course, the distinguishing element between the two is that the incoherent DAR utilizes a direct-detection receiver (Rx) and the coherent system employs a Rx that operates by homodyne down-conversion. The analysis performed was based upon standard radar techniques and employed very conservative sensor parameters -i.e., see (Woolard, Brown et al., 2002) . As documented earlier, the results for a incoherent DAR that utilizes a state-of-the-art cryogenic (4.2 K) bolometer detector yields reasonably good results. For example, for a cloud depth of 20 m and a concentration of IO' one can obtain a SNR of 10 and associated Pd and Pf, values of 0.75 and 0.006. However, the coherent DAR directly provides for significantly better overall performance. Indeed, the inherent homodyne down-conversion process provides for two important advantages. relative to the noise floor, generally yielding a superior SNR compared to the incoherent Rx. 'Second, because the phase of the received signal coheres to the demodulator input, the detection statistics are different. Analysis of the differencefrequency SNR, SNRDF, after the low-noise amplifier (LNA) leads to the curves shown in Fig. 3 (a) . Furthermore, to compare on equal footing to the incoherent DAR, we need to calculate the SNR after demodulation and integration (t, integration time). Assuming t, = 1 ms the curves of SNRpD shown in Fig. 3 (h) result. This SNRpD is approximately 300 times larger than the analogous post-detection SNR of the incoherent Rx, which is approximately 1.0 under the conditions of the bullet in Fig. 3 (h) . Application of the appropriate statistics (i.e., Rayleigh for noise-alone and Rician for signal-plus-noise (Barton, 1998)) yields the probability results given in Fig. 4 . For the conditions bulletized in Fig. 3 one can achieve the outstanding results that Pd = 0.99 for Pa= IO", Pd = 0.95 for Pra = IO4, and Pd = 0.90 for Pr, = 10. ' . These are, of course, just three points on a continuous Pd vs Pr. receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve.
SENSMC SCIENCE & BIO-AGENT ATTACK SCENARIO
A complete assessment of DAR sensor performance can only be achieved by considering its implementation within a realistic bio-agent attack scenario. Here, the issues of signature stability and enhancement also play important roles. If the goal is the monitoring of bioclouds at a distance (i.e., where a mirror must he deployed to a point opposite the cloud) then the issue of sensitivity over the field-of-view (FOV) for the cloud (i.e., how much of the cloud can you image) and how that varies as a function of time (i.e., how long can you see the cloud) become very important. This is important because it will define how many mirrors are required to provide the adequate levels for Pd and Pf, over the entire hattlespace. This issue is being addressed through the incorporation of data generated for a biological attack scenario. Here, numerical maps of bio-agent density timedependent evolution are simulated using the VLSTRACK computer model. This allows for mapping the system probability statistics over the user FOV and demonstrates the utility of the system on the battlefield. Figure 5 depicts one bio-agent scenario considered where 1 kilogram of material is released and drifts over a 30 h range. Imaging studies were gives an image of the trajectory mass (i.e., the bio-particle mass within a cylinder of aperture 1 m' along the DAR sensing trajectory) of the cloud along the A'-A and 300 s after the release. Here, the observer point is 1 ! an downwind and 0.5 km from the release trajectory. Figure  6 (h) gives a mapping of the pd from a position along the release trajectory. Here, the observer point is 1.5 km downwind and the ranging used is 1 km. These, and other images, have been used to determine that 100% confidence in remote detection can be achieved while the bio-concentration remains significantly below threat levels (i.e. < 0.6 cm-3). 
V. CONCLUSION
These results demonstrate that THz DAR standoff detection of hio-agents is feasible for threat-level concentrations in practical battlefield environments at sufficient ranges to provide for early warning.
